Post-Foundational Forgetting

“Another way of putting this would be to say that discourses render the material world meaningful. Objects such as rocks, office buildings or computer systems are not denied material reality. However, if something material is not articulated within a discourse it is difficult to include it as a meaningful object for social analysis. What we find in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is the argument that an object has a socially meaningful existence only insofar as it is rendered intelligible through discourse. Thus when material objects become the focus of human attention, then material aspects of social life are always written over with discourse. Discourses are also often embodied in certain material manifestations. For instance, technologies are always embedded within discursive arrangements. Conversely these discursive arrangements become influential insofar as they have a material embodiment in a certain technology (Bridgman and Willmott, 2006; cf Fleetwood, 2005: 201). ” (Cederström & Spicer, 2014, p.187)

Where are the boundaries of discursive arrangements?

Discourse, like methodology, is one of those words that gets used because it sounds good, while it doesn’t quite mean what you think it means. I mean – I guess on a surface level, yes, it’s all discourse, fine, whatever. But if we’re going to get a bit more technical, discourse means a regulated way of speaking (or writing, or communicating) through which objects and practices acquire significance (Barker, 2004). The idea of ‘regulation’ here is important; discourse operates according to established rules that shape what can be said, who can say it, and what will be accepted as true. These rules are implicit, unwritten, but shape what questions we ask, and what we accept as evidence.

Structuralism was sees meaning as understood through an underlying system of relations. Initially, quite literally; anthropologist Lévi-Strauss explored the recurring patterns in human relations, kinship systems and myths. These patterns were explained by the fixed ‘universal’ structure of the human mind (I’m reminded here of Chomsky’s thoughts on language, but that’s an argument for another day). Levi-Strauss cites Boas in noting that “all types of social phenomena (language, beliefs, techniques, and customs) have this in common, that their elaboration in the mind is at  the level of unconcsious thought” (Lévi-Strauss, 1969a, p.18, as cited in Rossi, 1973).  Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure argued that language is a system of signs whose meanings arise through their relationships with other signs. He pointed out that signs are arbitrary in that they have “have no natural connection with the signified” (1959, p.69), and being arbitrary (lacking a logical basis for discussion), and as products of social forces, always inheriting that which precedes them, cannot readily be changed (p. 74).

Post-structuralism critiques structuralism, suggesting that meaning is unstable, and decentering the subject (see Barthes’ Death of the Author).  (I should probably write a few paragraphs on Foucault here, but I’m not going to. Go read Discipline and Punish or something.)

It could be argued that the distinction between structuralist and post-structuralist isn’t all that useful. Marttila (2016) suggests a more useful strong structuralism vs weak structuralism, based on where the theory locates the production of meaning.  Weak structuralism (Foucault, Geertz) assumes that the production of meaning is dependent upon contextual circumstances – i.e.,  the cultural codes, social norms, and non-discursive elements such as institutions, power relations “located beyond discourses and discursive practices” (Martitila, 2016, p.20). Strong structuralism (Derrida, Lacan, Luhmann) argues that the origin of meaning resides solely in the “relational arrangement of meaning-conveying objects” itself; i.e. within the text. Marttila goes on to note the contrast: for Foucault there exists a relationship between discourse and the non-discursive realm, while for Derrida, “a text’s conditions of possibility cannot be located outside the text”.

Throwing around the word ‘discourse’ for me perhaps implies or invites at least some level of metacognition; we may not be conducting discourse analysis, but we’re alive to that possibility.  I often comment that to be ‘critical’ means that we must go beyond simply ‘describing’; there is an obligation to question and to seek to change. Similarly, the idea of discourse invites us to consider how and where meaning is produced. What assumptions are shaping our understanding? What constraints and enablers are we able to perceive? What is framed as legitimate or otherwise? And whose interests are being served?

References

Barker, C. (2004). Discourse. SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies. SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446221280.n67